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"What, Klapaucius, would you equate our existence 
with that of an imitation kingdom locked up in some glass 
box?!" cried Tror!. "No, really, that's going too far! My 
purpose was simply to fashion a simulator of statehood. a 
model cybernetically perfect, nothing more!" 
"Trorl! Our perfection is our curse, for it draws 
down upon our every endeavor no end of unforeseeable 
consequences!" Klapaucius said in a stentorian voice. "... 
Don't you see, when the imitator is perfect, so must be the 
imitation, and the semblance becomes the truth, the pretense a 
reality! ..." 
"Sheer sophistry!" shouted Trud, all the louder 
because he felt the force of his friend's argument. "... The 
subjects of that monster Excelsius do in fact die when 
decapitated, sob, fight, and fall in love, since that is how I set 
the parameters, but it's impossible to say, Klapaucius, that 
they feel anything in the process the electrons jumping 
around in their heads will tell you nothing of thatl" 
"And if I were to look inside your head, I would also 
see nothing but electrons," replied Klapaucius. "... You say 
there's no way of knowing whether Excelsius' subjects groan, 
when beaten, purely because of the electrons hopping around 
inside - like wheels grinding out the mimicry of a voice ­
or whether they really groan, that is, because they honestly 
experience the pain? A pretty distinction, this! No, Trod, a 
sufferer is not one who hands you his suffering, that you may 
touch it, weigh it, bite it like a coin; a sufferer is one who 
behaves like a sufferer! II 
This dialogue from Stanislaw Lem's charming collection entitled The 
Cyberiad: F abies for the Cyberne lic Age, captures perfectly the nature of a 
debate which has raged for nearly four decades among philosophers, 
psychologists, and computer scientists. Like Klapaucius' and Trurl's argument, 
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this debate focuses on the precarious status of the inner mental life of human 
artifacts which exhibit certain aspects of convincingly human behavior. In the 
real world, however, the artifacts in question are digital simulations not of 
kingdoms but of individual minds, and they are instantiated not in glass boxes 
but in the computers which have become such a familiar presence in modern 
society. This debate over the possibility of expressing true intelligence in terms 
of a computer program has found its two most eloquent rivals in the legendary 
war-era British computer scientist Alan Turing and the tenacious Berkeley 
philosopher John Searle. Their respective papers on artificial intelligence form 
the antipodal landmarks around which the rest of the debate has been mapped. 
Fundamentally, however, the differences between Turing and Searle reflect not 
only upon the specific issues of machine intelligence but upon more basic 
philosophical and scientific questions which can be traced back to the eighteenth 
century and to the question of the existence of purpose in the world of natural 
creation. Like the artificial intelligence debate, this issue had two definitive 
antagonists, David Hume and William Paley. The intellectual conflict 
surrounding their works extended into the nineteenth century, when Charles 
Darwin published his seminal Origin ofSpecies. Like many other debates, the 
issue of purpose was derailed by the upheaval which followed Darwin's work, 
as its fundamental assumptions where called into question and eventually fused 
into the Darwinian synthesis. Today, a new intellectual synthesis seems to be 
forming, and the antipodes ofTuring and Searle are drawn closer together by en 
inchoate philosophical tradition inspired by Daniel Dennett. Borrowing a page 
from Darwin, Dennett simultaneously reconciles and dismantles the arguments 
of Turing and Searle, using precisely the same philosophical mechanism by 
which Darwin both vindicates and undermines Hume and Paley. 
Although the idea of artificial intelligence as a serious conceptual 
possibility dates back to Charles Babbage, its first coherent philosophical 
expression is found in Alan Turing's "Computing Machinery and Intelligence," 
published in 1950. Turing. at the time a prominent although socially ostracized 
figure in the developing field of computer science, turns his attention to the 
question, "Can machines think?" He quickly rejects this formulation of the 
question as incoherent, pointing out that it contains terms whose extensions are 
too vaguely defined to be pressed into reputable philosophical service. In his 
own words, "The definitions might be framed so as to reflect so far as possible 
the normal use of the words, but this attitude is dangerous. If the meaning of the 
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words 'machine' and 'think' are to be found by examining how they are 
commonly used it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the meaning and the 
answer to the question, "Can machines think?' is to be sought in a statistical 
survey such as a Gallup poll." Turing insists that the question must be replaced 
with a second formulation, one which avoids conceptual terms shaded with 
nuances of interpretation and which relies only on well-defined, observable 
phenomena. From this basic operationalist stance, Turing proceeds to define his 
famous Turing test, according to which a human observer interrogates two 
hidden conversationalists and attempts to ascertain which is a human and which 
is a computer. The question which Turing considers can now be formulated as 
"Can a computer be programmed to pass the Turing test?", and Turing devotes 
the rest of the article to defending his argument that the two questions can be 
substituted for one another against a wide range of objections. 
An important point which must be recognized is that Turing does not 
offer his article as a defense of the ultimate possibility of artificial intelligence. 
At one point, he surmises that computers with a storage capacity of one 
thousand megabytes will be able to pass the Turing test by the end of the 
century; however, he offers no arguments to support this conviction, and he 
abandons it as merely a tangential point in his essay. As he admits, "The only 
really satisfactory support that can be given for the view expressed [in favor of 
artificial intelligence] will be that provided by walting for the end of the century 
and then doing the experiment described." Instead, Turing seeks to formulate a 
criterion which can be used to arbitrate the emotionally heated arguments 
surrounding artificial intelligence in a systematic way. He is less interested in 
defending the pursuit of artificial intelligence than in devising a mechanism to 
judge the products of that pursuit. In taking up this challenge, Turing finds 
himself confronted with the same dilemma which haunted the behavioral 
psychologists of his day: the seeming necessity of defining mental phenomena 
in purely observational terms. Turing correctly realizes that an intellectual 
consensus on machine intelligence can never be reached by appealing to the 
wildly varying institution which exist on the nature of intelligence: agreement 
can only be reached by reducing the question to one which can be answered 
through appeal to accessible, reproducible data. The strength of the Turing Test 
is that it reformulates the questions of artificial intelligence in a way that 
simultaneously appeals to our intuitions of linguistic behavior as an exclusive 
product of human-like intellect, preserves the vagueness inherent in the original 
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question by relying on the judgment of an interrogator, and utilizes a controlled 
set of experiments with verifiable results. In introducing this mechanism, 
Turing violates an unspoken philosophical tradition by insisting that our 
intuitions be forced to conform to our rigid conceptual formulations, rather than 
the other way around. Since "at the end of the century the use of words and 
general educated opinion will have altered so much that one will be able to 
speak ofmachines thinking without expecting to be contradicted," it makes no 
sense to base philosophical arguments on such malleable intuitions. From 
Turing's standpoint, the resolution of the artificial intelligence question must 
derive not from idle speculation concerning the ultimate nature of mental 
phenomena but from the establishment of a rigid scientific yardstick which 
permits no ambiguities in verification. 
For John Searle, on the other hand, such a yardstick can only be an 
obfuscating device used to promote a degenerate ideology which has captured 
the minds of computer scientists. In his 1980 paper "Minds, Brains, and 
Programs," he mounts a scathing attack against "the claims I have defined as 
those of strong AI, specifically the claim that the appropriately programmed 
computer literally has cognitive states and that the programs thereby explain 
human cognition." Although he cites the contemporary programming work of 
Schank, Winograd, and Weizenbaum as primary targets of his critique, the 
argument which he develops seems aimed directly at Turing, whom he views as 
the primary godhead of the artificial intelligence pantheon. Searle's infamous 
"Chinese room" thought experiment attacks the premises of the Turing test by 
constructing a hypothetical mechanism, analogous to a digital computer 
program, which is able to pass the test and yet which seems intuitively to fall 
short of any reasonable standard of human intelligence. Searle imagines himself 
confined to a room along with a huge body of un interpreted Chinese characters 
and a comprehensive set of formal rules for their syntactic manipulation. Native 
Chinese speakers pass messages written in Chinese to him; heapplies the 
algorithm to these messages and returns the resulting character sequences, which 
are actually appropriate responses in fluent Chinese. This system represents a 
finite program which could in theory be instantiated on a digital computer and 
which would presumably be able to pass any Turing test administered by a 
Chinese speaker. Yet, as Searle writes, "it seems to me quite obvious in the 
example that I do not understand a word of the Chinese stories. I have inputs 
and outputs that are indistinguishable from those of the native Chinese speaker, 
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and I can have any formal program you like, but I still understand nothing." In 
other words, Searle argues that the Turing test must fail as a criterion of 
intelligence, because his hypothetical computer program simulates the external 
linguistic behavior of human intellect in every particular, yet lacks 
understanding. a crucial factor in any conception of inner mentailife. 
Now, the battle lines are drawn between Searle and Turing, and it is 
worthwhile to reflect on their points of similarity and difference. Both Turing 
and Searle agree that human beings engage in certain behavioral patterns as a 
direct consequence of their possession of a set of faculties and inclinations 
which are collectively referred to as "intelligence"; in addition, both agree (at 
least for the sake of argument) that it is in theory possible to program digital 
computers to produce behavior which is identical to intelligent human behavior 
in all relevant aspects. They differ in their beliefs on what these two facts 
imply. For Turing, the fact that machines can instantiate intelligent behavior 
proves that they are at least in principle capable of intelligence in the full sense 
defined above. Turing argues from a position which Searle dismisses as 
"residual behaviorism or operationalism": the position that concepts such as 
intelligence are coherent only when defined in terms of the observable 
phenomena by which they are characterized, and thus that whatever produces 
these observable phenomena falls completely within the scope of the concept. 
Stripped of the emotional baggage it has acquired in recent philosophical and 
psychological discourse, the term "operationalism" seems a good one to use to 
refer to Turing's essential stance. Searle, on the other hand, opposes 
operationalism in all its forms. From his perspective, even though intelligence is 
ultimately defined in terms of unobservable "causal powers" which cannot be 
instantiated through any level of syntactic manipulation and whose presence, 
although presumably impossible to verify experimentally, nevertheless serves as 
an absolute requirement for the existence of true intelligence. Searle illuminates 
this position when he considers the natural tendency to attribute intelligence to 
any source of intelligent behavior: "The reason we make these attributions is 
quite intercsting, and it has to do with the fact that in artifacts we extcnd our 
own intentionality; our tools are extensions of our purposes, and so we find it 
natural to make metaphorical attributions of intentionality to them; but I take it 
no philosophical ice is cut by such examples." Here, Searle calls upon the 
philosophical concept of intentionality, which Brentano defines as "the hallmark 
of the Mental" and which can be associated with the set of faculties and 
26 
dispositions mentioned in the previous definition of intelligence. Searle is 
willing to grant to computers only "derived intentionality," a metaphorical 
shadow of the intentionality possessed by the resourceful computer 
programmers who create the illusion of intelligence. The introduction of 
intentionality provides another important way to characterize the debate between 
Turing and Searle: Turing believes that intelligent behavior is a failsafe indicator 
of the presence of intentionality, while Searle argues that the observation of 
such behavior gives us no means to determine whether the intentionality in 
question is original, true intentionality or illusory, derived intentionality. 
As stated previously, The Turing - Searle debate as it has been framed 
here bears a strong similarity to the intellectual debate over the Argument from 
Design which was carried on during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
Although the primary focus of this debate as it was formulated by its 
participants was the existence of the Deity, it can be reinterpreted in more 
religion-neutral terms without compromising the essential positions of its 
contributors as a debate over the existence of purpose in the universe. The 
strongest proponent of the Argument from Design was the nineteenth-century 
theologian William Paley, whose treatise Natural Theology serves as an 
expression of the argument in its purest form. Like Searle, Paley relies heavily 
on a thought experiment which he uses to call upon certain intuitions common to 
the human experience. He asks his readers to imagine crossing a heath and 
encountering a pocket watch lying on the ground, then to renect upon the 
probable cause of the watch's presence. In doing so, Paley invokes an 
overwhelming intuitive pull which forces any reasonable person to conclude that 
the only satisfactory explanation is the existence of an intelligent, purposeful 
watchmaker. From this point, the author extends the scope of this intuition to 
encompass the entire natural universe. As he writes, " ... every indication of 
contrivance, every manifestation of design, which existed in the watch, exists in 
the works of nature; with the difference, on the side of nature, of being greater 
and more, and that in a degree which exceeds all computation. I mean that the 
contrivances of nature surpass the contrivances of art, in the complexity, 
subtlety, and curiosity of the mechanism; and still more, if possible, do they go 
beyond them in number al}d variety: yet in a multitude of cases, are not less 
evidently mechanical, not less evidently contrivances, not less evidently 
accommodated to their end, or suited to their office, than are the most perfect 
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productions of human ingenuity." Paley devotes most of the remainder of his 
text to the presentation of various observations from the natural world which 
indicate a level of complexity, design, and purpose far superior to that of human 
artifacts. In adopting this tactic, Paley uses the same basic operationalist tactic 
employed by Turing. He begins by noting that the concept of purpose as applied 
to human artifacts is characterized by certain observable traits such as design 
efficiency and complexity; he then incorporates the opcrationalist assumption 
that the presence of these traits is both necessary and sufficient for the 
applicability of the concept. Thus, Paley concludes that both the presence or 
absence of purpose in Creation and the nature of this purpose can be discovered 
through the careful observation of accessible phenomena in the natural world. 
In this aspect, Paley and Turing share common philosophical ground. 
If Paley is the counterpart of Turing, then David Hume takes the role 
of Searle in the argument on design. Although Hume's Dialogues Concerning 
Natural Religion was published a quarter of a century before Natural Theology, 
it serves as a direct attack on the essential Argument from Design which Paley 
espouses. The dialogue pits Cleanlhes and Demea, who represent respectively 
the forces of reason and dogmatic Christian belief, against Philo, who disagrees 
with the Argument from Design as prcsented by the other two. CleanUlCs 
utilizes the argument in much the same manner as Paley; he observes a 
correlation of like effects shared by designed artifacts and natural phenomena, 
and from this concludes that rational purpose, the force responsible for these 
effecls in artifacts, must also be the cause at work in the case of Nature. Philo 
begins his refutation with the observation that the similarity between the two 
effects is tenuous and imperfect at best, and thus that the operationalist inference 
made by Cleanthes requires a broad stroke of the imagination to include the 
regularities of Creation within the scope of the characteristic symptoms of 
artificial purpose. Later in the dialogue, however, he develops an argument with 
a much more significant impact. As he points out, the observable world 
contains not one but two concepts of purpose, each of which bears its own set of 
related observablcs. Artifact!; have purpose which is imparted to them by their 
designers (an argument which foreshadows Searle's "derived intentionality"), 
while plants and animals possess a purpose which secms to derive from their 
own self-organization. Thus, the operationalist must decide which set of 
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characteristic phenomena the universe truly possesses before an assessment can 
be made of the nature of universal purpose. From here, Philo attacks Cleanthes' 
choice on this issue by stating that 
... the operation of one very small part of nature, to 
wit man, upon another very small part, to wit that inanimate 
matter lying within his reach, is the rule by which Cleanthes 
judges of the origin of the whole; and he measures objects, so 
widely disproportioned, by the same individual standard. But 
to waive all objections drawn from this topic; I afftrm, that 
there are other parts of the universe (besides the machines of 
human invention) which bear still a greater resemblance to the 
fabric of the world, and which therefore afford a better 
conjecture concerning the universal origin of this system. 
These parts are animals and vegetables. The world plainly 
resembles more an animal or a vegetable, than it does a watch 
or a knitting-loom. 
By developing this tactic, Hume (through Philo) both delivers a 
preemptive blow to Paley's work and brings the analogy to Turing and Searle 
full circle. Just as Turing uses operationalist assumptions to deduce the 
existence of intentionality in digital computers, Paley uses the same technique to 
infer the existence of purpose in the universe. And just as Searle argues that 
Turing's operationalism cannot distinguish between original intentionality and 
intentionality derived from the programmers of the computers, Hume argues that 
Paley and his ilk cannot differentiate between purpose derived from a Creator 
and original purpose contained within the organic structure of the universe itself. 
At this point, of course, Darwin intervenes. One of the few truly 
earthshaking publications in the history of science, The origin ofSpecies 
establishes a new intellectual framework from which all that has gone before it 
must be re-evaluated. With the adoption of Darwin's paradigm, the issues of 
purpose and operationalism as debated by Hume and Paley are swallowed by a 
dense cloud of ideas which borrow from both writers but which fail to entirely 
vindicate either. The great contribution of Darwin to the debate is the 
reformulation of purpose as a teleological concept: purpose acquires a definition 
only relative to a given environment and is defined solely in terms of selection 
value within that environment. Whatever succeeds in being selected for in a 
given environment possesses sufficient complexity and design efficiency to have 
purpose attributed to it within that environment. This reformulation collapses 
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Hume's two classes of purpose into a single notion: just as a species which is 
moved to a new environment may lose its survival potential and thus lose its 
right to be attributed purpose relative to that environment, an artifact which is 
given a new task may not be attributed design purpose relative to its new 
function. The example of a pocket watch pressed into service as a doorstop 
illustrates this well: although the watch's complexity and regularity may still 
provide reasons to attribute design to the watch. its failure to succeed in the role 
of doorstop precludes one from attributing design purpose to it. Likewise, 
Darwin does not answer the ultimately theological question of whether species 
are consciously designed or not; he merely provides a teleological framework 
for the ascription of purpose. Thus, Paley is in some sense vindicated by 
Darwin's recognition .of a single universal principle of purpose which can be 
derived through the observation of natural and artificial phenomena. However, 
Darwin's teleological formulation does not correspond exactly to Paley's 
concept of derived purpose. For Paley, purpose is derived from a supematural 
Creator; for Darwin, however, if purpose is derived at all, it is derived from the 
complicated interrelation between the species and the environment. In the 
Darwinian world, purpose is no longer a purely metaphysical property which is 
unambiguously possessed by certain objects and which manifests itself through 
observable phenomella; instead, it is an epistcmic notion which can be attributed 
to species only relative to a given environment and to the species' performance 
within that environment. Thus, Darwin refocuses the question of purpose from 
"'What possesses purpose?" to "In what contexts and under what circumstances 
can we attribute purpose?" 
It is this astonishingly successful strategy which inspires Daniel 
Dennett to seek a position which both reconciles and overthrows Turing and 
Searle. Dennett's twenty-year commitment to the pursuit of a coherent notion of 
intentionality begins with his 1969 book Content and Consciousness; however, 
his ideas find their first clear expression in the 1971 publication of "Intentional 
Systems." Here, Dennett introduces the idea of stance adoption, the utilization 
of a certain attitude toward a certain seat of behavior as a method of predicating 
or describing the behavior in question. He first discusses the design stance, 
which can be viewed as an elaboration of Darwin's reformulation of purpose as 
already discussed. Dennett describes the various versions of the design stance 
as "alike in relying on the notion of/unction, which is purpose-relative or 
teleological." When animals or artifacts are analyzed from the design stance, 
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they are ascribed a purpose appropriate to their environment and then assumed 
to possess a design structure appropriate to that purpose. In the study of 
electronic devices, the design stance manifests itself through "black box" 
analysis; in the study of biological organisms, it appears as the adaptionist 
school of thought, a version of which Dennett defends in his paper on 
"Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology." From this Darwinian framework, 
however, Dennett abstracts to a higher level of stance adoption. Noting that the 
design stance becomes largely inappropriate when applied to the behavior of 
complex systems such as humans, animals and computer programs, he 
introduces what ne calls the intentional stance. Adoption of this stance entails 
the assumption not only of environment-relative purpose bllt of purpose-relative 
rationality; by adopting the intentional stance, we assume that the systems under 
description have beliefs and desires appropriate to their environments and 
purposes and then predict their behavior by presuming that they will act 
rationally upon these beliefs and desires. 
Dennett's reformulation of intentionality in these terms forces a 
wholesale reconsideration of the presumptions which Turning and Searle share 
in their debate. Like Darwin's concept of purpose, Dennett's definition of 
intentionality is teleological: it establishes a basic assumption of rationality and 
then justifies the attribution of the concept to any being whose behavior meets 
the terms of the assumption. And like Darwin's approach, Dennett's is a stance­
relative concept: intentionalily is no longer a property which can be possessed 
by a system, but one which can only be attributed to a system. This conception 
seems to justify Turing's essential vision in every particular. According to 
Turing, any computer program which is able to pass the Turing test can 
obviously be described through adoption of the intentional stance as well as its 
human competitors can; thus, by Dennett's definition, the computer is an 
intentional system as surely as the human mind is. There exists one substantial 
difference between Turing and Dennett, however, which proves to be fatal to the 
philosophical spirit, if not the letter, of the Turing test. Turing views 
intentionality as a metaphysical property which can be identified by the presence 
of certain observable phenomena; however, he does not define the property as 
simply the conjunction of the observables. He agrees with Searle that 
intentionality has an intrinsically phenomenological and unobservable 
component; however, he argues that the presence of intentionality'S observable 
properties entails the presence of the metaphysical component as well. Dennett, 
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on the other hand, removes this component completely from his formulation of 
intentionality. As he writes, "We do quite successfully treat these computers as 
intentional systems, and we do this independently of any considerations about 
what substance they are composed of, their origin, their position or lack of 
position in the community of moral agents, their consciousness or self­
consciousness, or the determinacy of indeterminacy of their operations. The 
decision to adopt the strategy is pragmatic, and is not intrinsically right or wrong 
... it is much easier to decide whether a machine can be an intentional system 
than it is to decide whether a machine can really think, or be conscious, or 
morall y responsible." Thus Searle can claim some measure of vindication from 
Dennett's teleological position as well. Even though a machine which can pass 
the Turing test is by definition an appropriate target for adoption of the 
intentional stance, the act of adoption cannot confrrm or deny the presence of 
those unique phenomenological properties and "causal powers" which Searle 
views as necessary for the existence of what he refers to as original 
intentionality. 
In the end, however, neither Searle's nor Turing's conceptions of 
intentionality survive the transition to the teleological stance adoption of Darwin 
and Dennett. While Turing recognizes only a single form of primary 
intentionality and Searle divides intentionality into two types, original and 
derived, Dennett restricts the concept to a single notion which falls much closer 
to Searle's derived intentionality than to his idea of true intentionality. In his 
1987 paper on "Evolution, Error, and Intentionality," Dennett argues 
persuasively to this point. Just as our artifacts derive their purpose from the 
environment in which we use them, they derive their intentionality in the same 
way. From coin-operated vending machines which "perceive" and "judge" 
quarters and slugs to sophisticated chess computers which "invent" plans and 
"pursue" goals, the products of design can have the intentional stance attributed 
to them only as a consequence of their performance within a given functional 
environment. Human beings, however, arc nothing more than another species 
designed by the forces of evolution. Thus, just as Darwin demonstrates the 
purpose relativity of species, Dennett argues that the intentionality of all species, 
humanity included, is ultimately derived from the only truly primary level of 
intentionality: the level of evolutionary selection. We are machines designed by 
millennia of natural selection, and the fact that we can be described and 
predicated in terms of beliefs, desires, plans, and goals can be attributed entirely 
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to the motivating forces responsible for our presence and success within our 
environmental niche. This argument, then, brings the connection between 
Darwin and Dennett full circle. The arguments over operationalism advanced 
by Hume, Paley, Turing, and Searle are all swept aside by this powerful 
intellectual synthesis. The concepts of design, purpose, and intentionality are 
powerful ones which can afford us considerable explainatory and predicative 
power over a wide range of complex systems, from the myriad species of the 
natural world to the humans whom we interact with daily to the electronic 
machines which are rapidly changing the face of modem civialization. 
Ultimately, however, all of these attributions of purpose and intentionality must 
be relegated to the status of mere metaphors, of shadows derived from the single 
overriding purpose of natural selection. Through the blind manipulation of 
random genetic factors, an operation which scems wholly antithetical to the very 
essence of purpose and intelligence, nature has created a cosmic process 
endowed with a level of intentionality that dwarfs our own notion of 
intentionality and yet which provides the foundation for our use of the same 
notion. Dennett devises an intriguing passage which perfectly captures the 
difference between the position he shares with Darwin and the doctrine 
implicitly subscribed to by both Turing and Searle: "Aristotle said that God is 
the Unmoved Mover, and this doctrine announces that we are the Unmeant 
Meaners... [but] we are artifacts, in effect, designed over the eons as survival 
machines for genes that cannot act swiftly and informedly in their own interests. 
Our interests as we conceive them and the interests of our genes may well 
diverge - even though were it not for our gene's interests, we would not exist: 
their preservation is our original raison d' eire, even if we can learn to ignore 
that goal and devise our own summum bonum, thanks to the intelligence our 
genes have installed in us. So our intentionality is derived from the 
intentionality of our "selfish" genes! They are the Unmeant Meaners, not us!" 
This world-view of Darwin and Dennett is at once chilling and exhilarating. 
The choice is up to us: we can regard their ideas as a threat to the primacy of 
human authority, or as a challenge to press on in the pursuit of a comprehensive 
scientific vision of the forces which are ultimately responsible for our purpose, 
our intentionality. and our very existence. 
